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DETERRENCE OF ISIS AND KHORASAN 
Forensic Psychological Perspectives in Deterring the Impact of Acts of Terrorism from ISIS and 
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Jenny Li 
David B. Ross, Ed.D. 
Rande Matteson, Ph. D. 
 
Terrorism is a serious issue that affects lives around the world.  Is there a way to deter 
terrorists from engaging in terrorist attacks?  According to the Federal Bureau Investigation 
(FBI), there are two types of terrorism to consider: domestic and international.  For the purpose 
of this paper, international terrorism is defined as terrorism that takes place outside of the 
jurisdiction of the United States and domestic terrorism occurs in the United States (FBI, 2011). 
Terrorism has varying definitions depending on the country and agency enforcing terrorism laws. 
The United Nations does not have an agreed upon definition and Bruce (2013) argued that 
without an agreed upon definition, counterterrorism measures will not be effective.  This paper 
will focus deterrence of terrorist acts by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Khorasan 
from a forensic psychological perspective.   
It was, according to Sun Tzu, Chinese military specialist and general that, “One may 
know how to conquer without being able to do it” (Cowley & Parker, 1996).  It was nearly 2,000 
years ago since The Art of War was written, and it still serves as material being studied across the 
world in military academies.  Researchers have discussed the definition and impact of terrorism, 
and since the September 11 attacks, terrorism was coined with a new meaning.  Not that the act 
of terror itself was uncommon in the Western world, we know that it exists, but the depth of the 
organized attack showed the general public how vulnerable the United States is (Habermas, 
2001). 
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Considering the form of brutality, the unpredictability of the acts, and our frustrated 
attempts at trying to understand the goals of a terrorist, it is simple to say that this is a very 
complex topic.  Terrorists and their acts have been compared to one of a psychopath (Borum, 
2004).  In spite of this the appeals between “a terrorist” and “psychopath,” it is fair to say that 
terrorists are many things, but to view them as a collective group of psychopaths (Borum, 2004), 
may not take us one step closer to getting to know our enemy.  Let us look closer at one of the 
points Sun Tzu made.  The Western world has power, strategies, knowledge from a historical 
viewpoint, and contemporary warfare.  Yet, the United States seems to be more and more 
irresolute toward how to respond to terrorism.  A painful lesson learned post 9/11 is that the 
United States clearly did not understand our enemy.  For instance, Osama Bin Laden was 
underestimated for his financial capacity, mission, and resources in general (Hoffman, 2002). 
       As researchers strive to understand acts of terror from a political and psychological 
standpoint, one may try to look into strategic planning as known in warfare.  However, keep in 
mind and see beyond pure strategic warfare acts and realize that a clean cut balance-of-power 
approach, will have flaws, and perhaps be prone to more failure, especially in the war on 
terrorism (Pease, 2003).  As far as ISIS is concerned, it seems as if they are conducting warfare, 
but seemingly without any organizational rules.  
AQI, ISI, and Now ISIL/ISIS 
In 1999, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded the Islamic State, initially known as Jamāʻat 
alTawḥīd wa-al-Jihād, translating to “The Organization of Monotheism and Jihad.”  His 
background as a Sunni militant from Jordan had already made his skin thick from imprisonments, 
deaths, and other experiences (Corbett, 2014).  Associations to Osama Bin Laden were contested 
back in 2000, but it was not until 2004 that Zarqawi formally strengthened the network of the 
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group by joining the forces of al-Qaeda (Simonelli, 2014).  Al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by 
U.S. troops, and this is when the name of the group became the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), but 
after having expanded into Syria in 2013, its nom de guerre became the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria, also now known as ISIS (Corbett, 2014).  The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
sometimes known by its previous name as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), were 
officially established in 2013.  
        Founder of Al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi copied Osama bin Laden’s leadership 
strategy. “Zarqawi set up numerous semi-autonomous terrorist cells across Iraq, many of which 
could continue operating after his death” (Finer & Knickmeyer, 2006). The terrorist group 
beheads victims, straps suicide bombs on the mentally disabled to later be detonated as well as 
other heinous acts.  Following the death of Zarqawi, Abu Bakr-al Baghdadi became the current 
leader of ISIS.  
ISIS’ aim was to establish a caliphate in which they succeeded as their current leader, 
Abu Bakr-al Baghdadi, self-claimed the title.  History shows us that the last caliphate was 
abolished in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, “the father of modern Turkey” (BBC News, 
2014b).  ISIS wants to “overthrow the existing governments of unstable and Muslim-dominated 
nations to establish their own state” (Rodger, 2014).  Furthermore, ISIS is ambitious about 
expanding Islamist Ideology in order to “unify all Islamic countries,” as a result, both ISIS and 
al-Qaeda compete for influence over Islamist extremist groups around the world.  
One of their other aims is to establish Salafist ruling in parts of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, 
Jordan, Cyprus and Southern Turkey, and to proclaim a new caliphate.  As mentioned earlier, the 
new leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, managed to get ISIS denounced from al-Qaeda’s network 
earlier this year in February (Giovanni, 2014).  This was a result of al-Baghdadi trying to declare 
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the al-Nusrah front under the command of ISIS; despite the ongoing allegiance discussions 
between al-Nusrah Front’s leader and al-Qaeda.  Since June 2014, the militant group, ISIS, has 
already killed 2,000 people (Brachman, 2014).  
 ISIS is influenced by the Wahhabi movement, which is an ideological movement that has 
turned militant.  Abd al-Wahhab (c. 1702-c. 1791) was the “founder of the fundamentalist branch 
of the Islamic thought and practice known as Wahhabism” (Encyclopedia of World Biography, 
2015).  He began teaching in his hometown based on the Quran and later was influenced by the 
idea of monotheism.  He did not believe in a divine figure and from this he started to gain 
support and followers.  He believed that Muhammad’s time in Medina was the “ideal Muslim 
society” in which people should aspire to recreate.  He argued that all Muslims should pledge to 
only one Muslim leader, a caliph.  Wahhab stated that “those who would not conform to this 
view should be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated” 
(Crooke, 2014, para. 13).  To understand this movement one must understand the scope of Islam. 
The majority of ISIS’ income comes from oil.  They control a production of 80,000 
barrels a day in Iraq; whereas, in Syria they are in charge of 60% of the production, which is 
roughly 385,000 barrels a day (Iraq Energy Institute).  The territory they are fighting for overlaps 
with an area that possesses a lot of oil.  Because there is little development in those areas, we can 
infer that they continue to see oil as a large portion of their income for the future.  Although oil is 
their main income, they “built up something like a mini-state: collecting the equivalent of taxes, 
selling electricity, and exporting oil to fund its militant activities” (Beauchamp, 2014, para. 10).  
Although they have a high income, they also are formidable spenders.  There are medical 
expenses, safe houses, weapons and other equipment that are required.  They also pay salaries to 
the members based on family size and if the member is killed they promise to keep making those 
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payments to the family (Shatz, 2014).  This by itself can become costly with several thousand 
members. 
ISIS has important bases throughout Syria.  These bases offer them a safe zone when 
fighting Iraqis as they can retreat to Syria.  This tactic also aligns when they are fighting Syrians, 
as they are able to retreat to Iraq.  The campaign that America launched is constructed to address 
this problem.  They wish to destroy ISIS in both Syria and Iraq by expanding the air war.  This 
will put pressure on ISIS in both countries and give it nowhere to retreat to.  “The airstrikes in 
Iraq are no longer limited to limiting risks to US citizens or ending a humanitarian crisis: they’ll 
be all over Iraq, wherever the US wants to hit ISIS” (Beauchamp, 2014). 
        It is rather disconcerting when attempting to understand extremist groups, and 
specifically ISIS who do not seem to discriminate while they recruit, are seemingly barbaric 
(Andersson, 2014).  Because of their open mindedness of recruiting followers and fighters, they 
become even more dangerous to public safety due to their extended mobility.  Even within their 
own network, they choose to defy leaders of al-Qaeda, as can be shown in the al-Nusrah Front 
case.  Also, considering that approximately a third of the 35,000 fighters incorporated within 
ISIS are foreign recruits (Andersson, 2014), it is fair to state that ISIS is not simply rendered by 
religious fanaticism.  Nevertheless, religious elements cannot be discarded.  In relation to 
culture, Johnson (2013) spoke of how the influence of religious values remains more explicit in 
the Islamic world, as opposed to the Western culture.  For instance, the Western culture has had 
influences of institutional Christianity, but as of today, it has adapted to more secular values 
(Johnson, 2013).  Historically, we are seemingly familiar with the Ottoman Empire, the first 
prophet of Muhammad, and even told that Islamic jurists have always had ideas of that the end of 
history will see its light when “Dar Al-Islam (the house of Islam), overcomes the Dar Al-Harb 
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(the house of war, the non-Islamic world)” (Johnson, 2013).  What else is it that fuels ISIS?  
Perhaps this is a part of history that perpetuates the strong desire to establish Salafist ruling and 
claim territories for this?  Furthermore, is it a combined quest for territory, power, superiority, 
sovereignty, and perhaps even identity?  Surely, it cannot only be religion, culture, and from a 
microcosm sprung from the collective group they have created?  Naturally, this is difficult for us 
to digest; desires can have outrageous actions based on barbaric deeds, regardless of gender, age 
or group to form an identity of a group.  This cannot be anything else than psychopathy, 
right?  Johnson spoke of how theories of psychology are important for mental health purposes, 
how mental health practitioners understand theories in order to develop tangible understanding of 
a client.  Of course, we do not believe, nor does Johnson, that any member of an extremist group 
would knock on our door, ready to begin a journey of self-exploration and counseling.  The 
members of the militant group probably already see themselves as being on a self-fulfilling 
journey.  Looking at the different psychological theories that are mostly used in our 
contemporary world of mental health, it is not trivial to try to understand a terrorist through the 
lens of any of the theories.  It will help us in our understanding and war against terrorism to do 
so. 
 Johnson (2013) stated understanding terrorists with the existential theory is explained.  
Other theories can assist with understanding as well, for instance, Adlerian theory speaks of the 
innate need for belonging, which may perpetuate an inferiority complex, and as a result lead to 
desperate actions to fulfill self (Sharf, 2012).  It would be naïve to remain in some kind of belief 
and to simply dismiss acts of terror as the doings of a psychopath, even if it may seem to be the 
most satisfying way to identify a terrorist by (Andersson, 2014).  We have a need to label things, 
people and situations for a moment of false comfort.  Keep in mind, just because we put a name 
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to something, does not automatically mean we understand it.  “Psychopath” as a personality 
disorder which is not even listed in the recently updated DSM-V (Sellborn, 2013). 
How does one easily respond to acts that are besotted by such cruel violence and 
demands or cultural indications we cannot understand?  How do we even start to understand 
terrorism and from which aspect can we deter the impact of contemporary warfare that the grand 
acts of terrorisms imply?  How can we fully understand who ISIS is?  As Johnson (2013) 
believed more questions than answers, appear when looking at the mindset of a terrorist. 
Perhaps, viewing this extremist group, as a social collective might be a universal way to help us 
understand the historical elements of a group we are unfamiliar with.  We need to approach it 
with strategies of contemporary warfare, and as it is, war on terror.  We need to take in account 
tangible elements such as ethnicity, history, and other cultural factors, even intangible elements 
such as ideology (Johnson, 2013).  We need to start understanding the depth of the history, 
culture, ideology, the complexity, and historical trauma that comes with ISIS.  This is not to 
serve as a defense for their actions, but merely a standpoint to argue for how to not forget the 
tentative categorization of terrorist acts as simply uncontrollable, extreme, unpredictable and 
cruel.  Again, the world population must still remember it as very much so, a strategic warfare. 
        Looking at the followers of ISIS and the group itself, one can ask, is it an innate but a 
subconscious quest of identity, so strong it has lost all its rationale?  According to Maslow and 
the hierarchy of needs, as illustrated by McLeod (2014), the need for belonging and the search 
for an identity and self-actualization are innate within us.  Moreover, can the lack of rationale 
become a quest for immortality in some way?  Because surely, the sense of power when causing 
so much terror must somewhat satisfy that desire?  In theoretical approaches, such as the 
Adlerian theory, it is believed that each individual is born with inferiority and then strives for 
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superiority.  Many contributing factors play a role, but the social demands are a big part of it, and 
if disregarded, an inferiority complex can develop.  This can, for instance, result in great 
arrogance and egocentric motives to lead a life (Sharf, 2012).  For instance, it is not impossible 
to identify in followers and fighters of ISIS. 
        ISIS is known for their brutality and public and mass executions.  Footage and pictures of 
the gruesome killings have been posted online.  An Islamist militant who goes by the name 
“Jihadi John” beheaded two American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff.  The 
beheadings took place in just two weeks.  The first journalist was James Foley who went missing 
in 2012.  A video was then released in August 2014 warning the United States to stop airstrikes, 
which then ended with Foley’s death (Beauchamp, 2014).  Steven Sotloff was the second 
American to get captured and killed.  A video was released in which he was wearing an orange 
jumpsuit and a masked man with a knife was standing behind him.  In the video Sotloff stated 
that he is “‘paying the price’ for U.S. airstrikes against the group” (Democracy Now, 2014, para. 
5). He is also one of 71 journalists that have been killed in the last 3 years while reporting on the 
Syrian conflicts.  
There is also a civil war in Syria between the Syrian government and affiliated parties, 
and the opposition parties such as Jabhat Al-Nusra, Free Syrian Army, and ISIS.  The war began 
in March 2011 as public protests spread around the country due to the arrest and torture of 
children who wrote anti-government graffiti on a wall.  The protesting was peaceful in the 
beginning but the government responded with anger and violence.  The people of Syria want 
greater freedom and for President Bashar al-Assad to resign as the Assad family has held power 
since 1971 (BBC News, 2014a).  Since the conflict began, roughly 203,000 deaths have been 
counted for; but the real toll is estimated to be 280,000 since not all deaths have been verified 
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(Syrian Observatory for Human Rights). 
It is important to keep in mind that ISIS is a product of the Iraq War and not a product of 
the Syrian Civil War.  “It has been enhanced by the conflict in Syria, but not created by it” 
(Prashad, 2014).  The war was and still is an opportunity for ISIS to gain territory and seize 
power and control. 
Khorasan 
        There is a separate al-Qaeda cell in Syria known as Khorasan.  President Barack Obama 
called the Khorasan group seasoned al-Qaeda operatives (Yan, 2014).  The group is trying to 
achieve success in the way that ISIS did by using social media to recruit Westerners.  The 
difference between the two groups is that Khorasan wants to attack mainly the United States and 
other parts of the world; whereas, ISIS wishes to gain territory in the region.  What distinguishes 
Khorasan from the rest of the organizations is that they expressed little interest in the outcome of 
the war (Masi, 2014). 
          The Khorasan Group first appeared in mainstream media in 2012, but they have been 
around for much longer than that.  The Khorasan Group is made up of high-ranking members of 
Al-Qaeda who relocated after 2001.  Information about this group is scarce and many people do 
not know this group exists and/or believes the United States government created this group as a 
reason to attack Syria.  What we do know tells us that this group is small and made up of only 
elite members.  The Khorasan group’s affiliation and status in the jihadist movement speaks to 
the threat it poses. 
        The Khorasan group is a separate entity from the Islamic State.  These two groups share 
similar views on Islam, but the Khorasan group does not condone the acts of their fellow terrorist 
group, ISIS.  The group believes that the attacks against Muslims depreciate the main goal of the 
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movement, which is to take control of a wide range of Western nations.  One of the main reasons 
we have not heard much about this group is because they keep a low profile, while instructing 
others to do their bidding.  Unlike ISIS, this publicly demonstrates their power and range by 
broadcasting attacks in the media.  ISIS can be viewed as the little brother to the Khorasan 
group.  ISIS does not yet understand how to break the rules without getting caught nor do they 
understand that a low profile is the best way to cause the most damage without being suspected. 
The Khorasan group, being Al-Qaeda members; has also demonstrated that they can attack 
foreign nations including the United States and have the means to do so.  ISIS has only ever 
attacked in the areas surrounding their central location (Thompson, 2014).  Despite being 
overshadowed by ISIS in the general media, The Khorasan group’s existence demonstrates the 
strength and resilience of Al-Qaeda and shows the West that this group continues to be a real 
threat on foreign soil.  The group’s presence also demonstrates that taking down one key member 
will not disband the entire group.  The United States killed Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda is 
still in existence.  Western nations have a much bigger problem on their hands than ISIS.  The 
focus should be destroying the jihadist movement at its most basic level rather than attempting to 
go after the different groups separately. 
        The Khorasan group poses a serious threat to western nations merely because the group is 
made up of members with excessive experience on terrorist attacks, a wide range of adversaries 
in different countries, and the ability and knowledge on how to recruit members both domestic 
and foreign.  This group has a high level of intelligence and has managed to stay well below the 
radar of the West until recent years.  The United States and other nations still do not know how 
far their reach extends and that alone speaks to their level of threat.  The American Enterprise 
Institute published an article on the current events stating, “The Khorasan group’s precise role in 
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Syria is not fully known, but it is behind efforts to recruit and train Americans and Europeans for 
operations in the West.”   
        Information about this group has been mixed.  Some individuals believe this group is a 
real threat, which is described in the previous section and in later sections.  Many people in the 
United States and other nations believe this is a new terrorist organization and do not realize that 
this group is essentially Al-Qaeda minus a few players.  Controversial perspectives have 
emerged as to origins and influence of this group, but gaining information on the origin will be 
difficult to obtain.  Attempting to conduct research on this group has not been fruitful in the past 
and will not become any easier.  The Khorasan group has lasted so long because of the tactics 
they employ.  The United States and other Western nations have work to do if they want to 
successfully stop the spread of this group and ultimately deter attacks from the Khorasan group. 
Global Perspective 
The United States and global perspectives on ISIS and the Khorasan group can be found 
in popular magazines, news outlets, and social media.  However, abundant research on United 
States and global perspectives and how it impacts the lives of those countries citizens is lacking.  
In the United States and worldwide, perspectives on these groups and how they should be 
handled are controversial.  Research on ISIS and the Khorasan group is rare; however, research 
on terrorism perspectives is more abundant.  In this section, we will discuss United States and 
global perspectives on terrorism as well as ISIS and the Khorasan group.  In 2012, 6,771 
terrorist’s attacks occurred worldwide, resulting in more than 11,000 deaths and more than 
21,600 injuries.  Of those attacks and casualties, 1,141 were perpetrated by ISIS and Al- Qaeda 
in Iraq.  Those numbers rose in 2013 to 9,707 terrorist attacks and resulted in 17,800 deaths and 
32,500 injuries.  According to 2013 statistical data, ISIS and Al-Qaeda were responsible for 
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2,126 attacks and casualties (National Consortium, 2012, 2013).  
In 2008, researchers converged for an international conference to discuss terrorism, 
modernity, and the global perspective on violence (German Historical Institute, 2008).  
Alexander Demandt explained that terrorism has been around for more than two millennia.  He 
described that if violence is effective; it becomes a “rational means to an end.”  Demandt also 
offered that if there is no immediate result, the violence will escalate until the ultimate goal is 
achieved.  From that, he concluded that terrorism is just a part of history.  In opposition, David 
Rapoport spoke of terrorism appearing only in modern times and explained that terrorism in the 
last two centuries is dissimilar from past historical violence.  Rapoport called for researchers to 
look critically at modern culture and technology.  Dan Edelstein from Stanford University (2015) 
offered the idea that terror came from the tradition of natural rights in which he referenced the 
French revolution as well as the Nazi and Soviet regimes.  Joshua Goldstein and Gavin Cameron 
viewed terrorism philosophically and described it as a “modern process of simultaneous identity 
construction and destruction,” and explained that “this dynamic of violence exposes 
contemporary terrorism as a logical articulation of modern identity” (German Historical Institute, 
2008).  Researchers from institutions worldwide came together to present their work on 
terrorism.  From this conference, we get a glimpse of the research that has already been done on 
terrorism. 
Perspectives on ISIS vary from country to country as well as the interpretation of the 
threat they pose.  Even within one country the perspectives can be quite different.  Mark 
Thompson (2014) wrote in Time Magazine that ISIS as well as Al-Qaeda is weak and only 
gained recognition after attacking western nations.  ISIS demanded the United States and their 
allies attention when they kidnapped and murdered innocent people and beheaded journalists on 
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the Internet for everyone to see.  Thompson presents two very different points of view about the 
potential threat of ISIS.  Quoting Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, “They (ISIS) marry ideology, 
a sophistication of strategic, and tactical military prowess, they are tremendously well-funded. 
Oh, this is beyond anything that we’ve seen. So we must prepare for everything.”  Secretary of 
State John Kerry expresses the opposite point of view; saying “These guys (ISIS) are not 10 ft. 
tall. They’re not as disciplined as everybody thinks; they’re not as organized as everybody 
thinks.”  He goes on to describe Pentagon reports about ISIS targets which shows that their 
resources are no match for western nations.  Thompson does not want citizens to underestimate 
ISIS and their abilities, but wants to put the potential threat into perspective.  His belief is that 
the best way to deal with ISIS terrorists is to understand how they came about and deal with it 
before they pose a larger threat worldwide (Thompson, 2014).  
Those attitudes reflect what government officials and media experts believe; however, the 
general public in the United States seems to feel differently.  Polling done by NBC News/Wall 
Street Journal showed that 47% of Americans believe the United States is unsafe and only 26% 
believe that the United States is safe (Murray, 2014).  Previous interventions have been met with 
little acceptance as Americans believe that the Iraq war failed to reduce the threat of terrorism 
and 38% believe the war made the United States less safe.  Polls show that Americans have a 
strong belief on how to handle the ISIS situation.  Ekins (2014) recorded that the Reason-Rupe 
poll found that more Americans favor airstrikes over sending troops.  The majority of 
Republicans believe the United States should send troops and will need a large number of troops 
as well.  The differences among different age groups in the United States are noteworthy.  The 
majority of individuals 18 to 29 oppose airstrikes, but the majority of older age groups actually 
support military action; however, the majority across age groups opposes sending ground troops 
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(Ekins, 2014). 
Across the globe, individuals from different countries offer their perspectives on ISIS.  
Syrian activist, Yassin al-Haj Saleh; stated he is ambivalent about a Western attack against ISIS. 
He believes that ISIS should be eradicated from the world because of the harm they have done to 
Syrians and their revolution.  However, he also believes that an intervention from the West 
would make Syrians suspicious of western motives for intervention.  His belief is that fault lies 
with Americans role in the region and problems within Islam.  Another Syrian activist explains 
that ISIS will not be destroyed until there is analysis of their uprising.  Kadouni continued to say 
that many Syrians believe ISIS to be their liberator from the Assad regime and stopping the 
Assad regime is necessary (Postel, 2014).  Mike Ghouse, an Islamic leader; presents the 
perspective that what ISIS is doing goes against their holy book and religion should not be used 
for justification.  His Holiness the Dalai Lama, a Buddhist leader; offers a similar perspective as 
Ghouse explained that acts from ISIS contradict the Koran which condemns such acts from ISIS 
contradict the Koran which condemns such acts (Boothe, 2014).  More information is necessary 
to provide statistically significant information.  Perspectives in the United States and globally 
tend to overlap and each country has views on the best way to combat terrorist acts from this 
group. 
The global perspective of the Khorasan group in this section is given from the United 
States perspective of the group’s threat worldwide.  Information on United States and global 
perspectives on the Khorasan group and how to deal with them moving forward is not readily 
available.  The Khorasan group has not been prominent in media outlets and has not been the 
focus of public attention for a few years.  A small percentage of individuals in the United States 
have offered their perspectives on the threat of the Khorasan group and what should be done. 
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Researcher, James Phillips (2014) of The Heritage Foundation; reminded us that the Khorasan 
group is compiled of high status Al-Qaeda members.  He explained that the rise of this group 
shows how much of a threat this group is.  The Khorasan group took information gained through 
Al-Qaeda and recruited individuals who were already suffering.  In other words, the Khorasan 
group capitalized on vulnerable states and their people.  Phillips referenced United States 
official’s statement to further explain the perceived threat: “U.S. officials now see the Khorasan 
group as, ‘the primary Al-Qaeda entity plotting near-term attacks against the west’” (2014, p. 3). 
Dissimilar to ISIS, the Khorasan group main focus is direct attacks on western nation’s soil.  The 
groups continued presence may mean that they have support from the Iranian government which 
allows them to continue recruiting more domestic and foreign adversaries.  Phillips explained 
that the Khorasan group will become a larger threat if intervention on Al-Qaeda as a unit is not 
done.  Analysis of the groups rise to power and intervention on a basic level is necessary to ward 
off potential attacks in the future.  Recently, many foreign citizens have showed support for the 
Islamic revolution and have joined terrorist organizations.  Matthew Levitt from the Washington 
Institute points out that the Khorasan group is such a huge threat because of their presence in 
Syria.  They have access to supportive foreigners and the knowledge to carry out their cause 
effectively.  The Khorasan group has a big range including members and countries they are 
active in (Levitt, 2014).  However, Obama spoke on the recent airstrikes in Syria and confirmed 
that the leader of the Khorasan group, Fadhli, was killed.  This act of counterterrorism is 
considered a success, but it may not slow the progress this group has made in the Middle East.  
This new information is the only information given by government officials and almost nothing 
is known about the actual impact of the recent attacks.  The lack of information on the Khorasan 
group makes it difficult to obtain a well-rounded perspective of this group worldwide.  As 
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mentioned previously in this section, there is a deficit in the information that is available about 
cultural perspectives on ISIS and the Khorasan group.  It is hard gaining a clear, complete view 
of public attitudes and perspectives on these groups and how to deter acts of terrorism by them.  
Research on terrorism needs to be updated constantly to keep up with current events.  That type 
of research could provide information on how best to counteract terrorist progress.  Research on 
ISIS and the Khorasan group is non-existent and obtaining evidence-based research would not be 
easy with the process being on going and gradual.  However, evidence based research is 
necessary to develop a good grasp of how best to deter terrorism. 
Deterrence and Counterterrorism Measures 
        According to Kroenig and Pavel (2012), deterrence is a strategic interaction in which an 
individual prevents the opposition from taking action that the opposition otherwise would have 
taken by convincing the opposing party that the cost of taking the action will outweigh potential 
gains.  In other words, the individual can shape the opposition’s perception of the cost or benefit 
of the concerned action.  Kroenig and Pavel (2012) suggested it is necessary to separate a 
terrorist network into its various functional roles.   
We are not going to deter or defeat terrorism by viewing them through the lens of pure 
warfare strategies.  The understanding of our enemy and ourselves are paramount, as is the 
understanding of the culture, religion, ISIS as a social collective, psychological and political 
aspects; all of this together as an anti-terrorist framework, could possibly lead us closer to an 
even start to deter some of the impact impinged upon us.  For instance, for now, ISIS has chosen 
to fight their enemies on their home ground instead of trying to threaten the United States 
specifically (Simonelli, 2014).  While this may be true and perhaps a relief, it is crucial for us to 
not allow ourselves into a blind spot where we end up underestimating the network, 
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organizational skills, capacity or agenda of ISIS.  There might not be a solution to end the war on 
terrorism in this century; however, we must keep looking for understanding, and look at their 
weaknesses.  Perhaps long-term airstrikes ordered by President Obama is not the best way to 
reduce threats of ISIS (Corbett, 2014).  While we have no answers, we hope to find other 
solutions in attempts to reduce ISIS and their mobility.  The airstrikes might just perpetuate their 
mobility by an expansion?  Undoubtedly, many factors play a part and while it may be difficult, 
one should start and look more into the topic of gender (Soussan & Weingarten, 2014) as one of 
the ingredients necessary to incorporate in future anti-terrorism strategies?  Regardless of how 
we respond to ISIS in this war against terrorism, we can be sure to initiate more aggression and, 
supposedly, their plans for retaliation.  We must then not let the impact of ISIS shake our ground 
and remember one of the other principles taught by Sun Tzu: “Rouse him, and learn the principle 
of his activity or inactivity.  Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.” 
According to Abrahms (2014), there are two traditional ways of looking at deterrence.  
The first way of deterring terrorists is by punishment, which ultimately punishes someone from 
their actions.  The second way of deterrence is deterrence by denial, which denies an individual 
benefits.  Terrorists tend to be undeterrable, especially when it comes to recruitment.  New 
terrorist recruits obtain benefits from joining a terrorist group.  New members gain a sense of 
purpose and belonging.  Many gain respect and join to end their lives or the lives of others 
(Abrahms, 2014). 
Similarly, Kroenig, and Pavel (2012) created a direct and indirect approach to deterring 
terrorists.  The direct response is when a direct threat is made to respond against the terrorists or 
threaten to deny tactical success including strengthening homeland security.  Often terrorist 
groups can be deterred by simple threat of retaliation.  Terrorist may also respond differently 
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with the possibility publicizing their resilience, such as adequate disaster planning and 
emergency response systems.  The indirect response to terrorist includes threatening to respond 
against assets valued by terrorist groups.  This indirect method includes imposing costs or 
restrictions on the families of terrorist members.  One must identify what the objectives being 
sought in their terror strategy.  For example, if terrorist group’s primary goal is to gain exposure 
through the media, the country could limit the publicity and coverage or that terrorist attack or 
organization.  One could also use the strategic level of denial.  This could include keeping United 
States troops in the Middle East despite increasing demands to remove the troops.  Explaining to 
the terrorist group that no matter how much violence they inflict, the U.S. troops will remain, 
will in theory lessen the incentive to carry out attacks. 
Sandler and Arce (2003) discussed how game theory can be used to deter terrorism as 
well as strategic and mathematical calculations to make decisions.  Although generally used in 
economics, psychologists have been able to study game theory by looking at human behavior 
and emotion.  Sandler and Arce stated that game theory captures the strategic interactions 
between terrorists and a targeted government.  It also helps those who are trying to act according 
to how they think their counterparts will act and react.  Each side issues threats and promises to 
gain a strategic advantage and one can analyze the costs and benefits of a decision.  A 
psychologist can use this strategy to deter both Khorasan and ISIS terrorists.   
        One group that may be possible to deter are supporters of terrorists (Abrahms, 2014).  
Knox (2014) described two statutes that prohibit providing material support or resources used to 
aid in carrying out terrorist attack, specifically 18 U.S.C. Sections 2339A and 2339B.  Section 
2339A makes it illegal to demonstrate support for crimes terrorist committed and providing 
assistance or materials to facilitate terrorist attacks.  Section 2339B extends 2339A to supporting 
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foreign terrorists.  To violate this statute, one must knowingly assist a foreign terrorist 
organization in which the individual is aware they are engaging in terrorist activities (Knox, 
2014).  Unfortunately there are currently no statutes regarding recruitment of individuals, 
although with the recent advances in technology, online recruitment is becoming more prevalent 
and is difficult to prove.  Forensic psychologists can assist policy makers in developing policies 
to address crimes related to terrorism.  The USA PATRIOT Act was created following 9/11 to 
help fight terrorism and is set to be updated in summer 2015.  Forensic psychologists could play 
a key role in developing this act and can assist with creating new strategies for deterring 
terrorism (Weimann, 2006).   
        Stevens (2005) suggested a multidisciplinary approach to countering terrorism.  
Behavioral sciences, such as psychology, assist with profiling terrorists, teaching tolerance and 
acceptance, modifying images of terrorism in the media, and by assisting building international 
policy and conflict resolution.  Currently there are 12 psychological associations that help United 
Nations policy makers work towards peace, security, economic and social advancement, and 
human rights (Stevens, 2005).  Policy makers should obtain various perspectives when creating 
policies and psychologists can provide key insight. 
        According to Torres-Soriano (2013), it is difficult to deter terrorist from using social 
media.  Once one website is taken down, another one is quickly put back up.  To create a social 
media account on sites such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, all an individual needs is an 
email address.  This means that an individual does not need to provide name or contact 
information besides an email.  There is no shortage of emails for an individual or group to create 
(Torres-Soriano, 2013).         
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